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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEAGUE TO SAVE LAKE TAHOE
and SIERRA CLUB,

Plaintiffs,

v.

TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING
AGENCY,

Defendant.

NO. CIV. S-08-2828 LKK/GGH

O R D E R

Development in the Lake Tahoe region is regulated by the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency ("TRPA"). TRPA amended its "shorezone" ordinances on October 22, 2008. Plaintiffs League to Save Lake Tahoe and the Sierra Club challenge these amendments, arguing that in adopting them TRPA violated the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact and the implementing Code of Ordinances.

Pending before the court are cross motions for summary judgment on liability. The California State Lands Commission has filed a brief supporting plaintiffs and the Shorezone Property Owners Association has filed a brief supporting TRPA. The court

1 resolves the matters on the papers and after oral argument.

2 **I. Background¹**

3 **A. Lake Tahoe**

4 For well over a century, writers have praised Lake Tahoe's
5 beauty. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. TRPA, 535 U.S. 302, 307
6 (2002) (quoting Mark Twain, Roughing It 174-75 (1872)). For over
7 forty years, government has struggled to preserve this treasure.
8 Id. at 308. With mixed optimism and pessimism, the court expects
9 both the praise and the struggle to continue.

10 Lake Tahoe is an alpine lake located in the northern Sierra
11

12 ¹ The facts discussed by the court are undisputed unless
13 otherwise noted. The League, TRPA, and Shorezone Property Owners
14 Association have requested judicial notice of various government
15 documents or decisions. Although review of the challenged decision
16 is made on the administrative record, the submitted documents that
17 predate the decision or constitute aspects of the amended
18 ordinances themselves may supplement the record. No party has
19 objected to judicial notice of the pre-decision documents. All of
20 these exhibits are judicially noticeable within the meaning of Fed.
21 R. Evid. 201.

22 TRPA and Shorezone Property Owners Association further request
23 judicial notice of documents post-dating the challenged decision,
24 including TRPA's 2009 decision to postpone consideration of pier
25 applications until 2011, TRPA's 2010 Annual Shorezone Program
26 Report dated March 17, 2010, and the Blue Boating Program Phase II
Implementation Plan dated March 24, 2010. Insofar as the instant
suit concerns whether TRPA's 2008 decision to adopt the Amendments
was supported by the record, these after-the-fact documents have
limited relevance, if any. "[I]t is not 'appropriate . . . to use
post-decision information as a new rationalization either for
sustaining or attacking the Agency's decision.'" Rybachek v. U.S.
Envntl. Prot. Agency, 904 F.2d 1276, 1296 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting
Ass'n of Pac. Fisheries v. Envntl. Prot. Agency, 615 F.2d 794, 811
(9th Cir. 1980)). TRPA suggests that the court consider these
exhibits as "events indicating the truth or falsity of agency
predictions[, which] should not be ignored." Amoco Oil Co. v.
Envntl. Prot. Agency, F.2d 722, 729 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The
court declines to adopt this rationale for considering the
exhibits.

1 Nevada Mountains and spanning the California-Nevada border. The
2 lake is famous for its exceptional clarity, "which depends largely
3 on the amount of suspended fine sediments and, to a lesser degree,
4 algal productivity." Administrative Record at Volume 7, page 4046
5 (hereinafter "AR Vol.:Page"). The amount and productivity of algae
6 is in turn largely a function of the amount of nutrients in the
7 water. Id. Beginning around the 1960s, human activity in the area
8 began increasing the amount of nutrients and sediments in the lake,
9 initiating what has been a steady decline in water clarity. Id.,
10 see also AR 11:7313. Although visibility previously extended to
11 over 100 feet below the lake's surface, over 30% of this visibility
12 has been lost. AR 7:4201, 4045, 11:7313.

13 Water clarity is not the only aspect of the lake to have
14 suffered. The Lake Tahoe Basin has also suffered from degradation
15 of other measures of water and air quality. Many of the aesthetic
16 and recreational values of the region have been impaired, including
17 scenery, noise, and the ability to use the lake for recreational
18 purposes.

19 A major cause of these declines is development in the basin.
20 Onshore development introduces nutrients and sediment by, among
21 other things, eliminating wetlands and undisturbed lands that
22 filter runoff and by increasing sewer line exfiltration and septic
23 leachate. See also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 308.
24 Piers and other structures that enable boating also impact
25 protected values, such as fish habitat and recreation. AR 6:4007,
26 7:4173. Separate from the effects of development, emissions from

1 motorized watercraft harm air and water quality, including water
2 clarity.

3 **B. The Tahoe Regional Compact & TRPA's Regulation**

4 Efforts to address these problems have been shaped by the fact
5 that jurisdiction over the Lake Tahoe Basin is shared by the States
6 of California and Nevada, five counties, several municipalities,
7 and the United States Forest Service. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council,
8 535 U.S. at 308. In 1968, the legislatures of the two States
9 adopted the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, which Congress
10 approved in 1969. In 1980, the initial Compact was amended "to
11 increase the level of environmental protection for the Basin as a
12 whole." Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. TRPA, 322 F.3d 1064,
13 1071 (9th Cir. 2003); see also 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 872, p. 2710 §
14 2 (codified as amended at Cal. Gov't Code § 66801); 1980 Nev. Stat.
15 1 (codified at Nev. Rev. Stat. 277.200); Act of Dec. 19, 1980, Pub.
16 L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233. The Compact is "federal law" for
17 purposes of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and is interpreted
18 pursuant to federal principles of statutory interpretation. League
19 to Save Lake Tahoe v. TRPA, 507 F.2d 517, 525 (9th Cir. 1974), Lake
20 Tahoe Watercraft Rec. Ass'n v. TRPA, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1068
21 (E.D. Cal. 1998).

22 The 1980 Compact (hereinafter "Compact") directed TRPA to
23 develop regional "environmental threshold carrying capacities"
24 Compact art. I(b) and V(b). Environmental threshold carrying
25 capacities ("thresholds") are environmental standards "necessary
26 to maintain a significant scenic, recreational, educational,

1 scientific or natural value of the region or to maintain public
2 health and safety within the region" and "shall include but not be
3 limited to standards for air quality, water quality, soil
4 conservation, vegetation preservation and noise." Compact art.
5 II(I). TRPA has adopted 36 separate threshold standards, including
6 standards for water clarity and quality, air quality, noise levels,
7 recreational access, and scenic quality. See, e.g., AR 29:19179-94
8 (TRPA Resolution 82-11, as amended) (adopting initial thresholds),
9 AR 11:7207 (discussing thresholds presently in effect).

10 TRPA must regulate the region in order to achieve these
11 thresholds "while providing opportunities for orderly growth and
12 development consistent with such capacities." Compact art. I(b).
13 One aspect of TRPA's regulation is promulgation of generally-
14 applicable rules and plans. Most broadly, TRPA adopted a Regional
15 Plan in 1987. This document is "a single enforceable plan" that
16 includes many correlated elements relating to the regulation of the
17 Basin, including "[a] conservation plan for the preservation,
18 development, utilization, and management of the scenic and other
19 natural resources within the basin." Compact art. V(c)(3). The
20 Regional Plan is implemented by the Code of Ordinances and the
21 Rules of Procedure promulgated by TRPA. See Comm. for Reasonable
22 Regulation of Lake Tahoe v. TRPA, 311 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979-80 (D.
23 Nev. 2004).

24 TRPA also regulates on a project-specific basis. Before
25 approving any project, TRPA must ensure that the project will not
26 interfere with implementation of the regional plan or cause the

1 thresholds to be exceeded. Compact art. V(g). TRPA must also
2 prepare an environmental impact statement ("EIS") for the project,
3 similar to the reporting required by the National Environmental
4 Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. ("NEPA") and the California
5 Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 2100-21176
6 ("CEQA"). Compact art. VII(a)(2). A project cannot be approved
7 unless either "changes or alterations" have reduced "the
8 significant adverse environmental effects to a less than
9 significant level" or the agency determines that mitigation is
10 "infeasible." Compact art. VII(d)(1) and (2).

11 **C. The 2008 Shorezone Amendments**

12 On October 22, 2008, TRPA's governing board adopted the
13 Shorezone Amendments. AR 1:1-3. These Amendments' provisions
14 regarding piers, buoys, and other boating facilities form the core
15 of this case.

16 Prior to the Amendments, a rule designed to protect fish
17 habitat was the primary limit on construction of boating
18 facilities. Approximately two thirds of the lakeshore was
19 designated as "prime fish habitat," which included habitat needed
20 for spawning, fish feed and cover, or within 200 feet of designated
21 spawning streams. See AR 6:3860. In these areas new construction
22 was prohibited and existing structures could only be modified when
23 the modification would "decrease in the extent to which the
24 structure does not comply with the development standards" and would
25 improve attainment or maintenance of threshold standards. Id., AR
26 3:1884-88.

1 In the process leading up to the Amendments, TRPA concluded
2 that the above prohibition went beyond what was necessary for fish
3 protection, a conclusion plaintiffs do not challenge here. AR
4 2:734-62. The Amendments repealed the prohibition on construction
5 in fish habitat, allowing new facilities to be constructed within
6 certain other limits. Most notably, the amended ordinances place
7 numeric caps on the number of boating facilities that can be placed
8 on the lake. The Amendments allow an additional 128 private piers,
9 10 public piers, 1,862 new mooring buoys, 6 new boat ramps, and 235
10 boat slips to be constructed or placed within Lake Tahoe's
11 Shorezone. TRPA Amended Code of Ordinances §§ 52.2.B, 52.4.B, 52.5
12 (hereinafter "Code"). In addition to these "new" facilities, the
13 Amendments allow TRPA to issue permits for buoys that are already
14 on the lake but that are unpermitted; TRPA may also authorize buoys
15 to replace these unpermitted buoys if and when the unpermitted
16 buoys are removed. Compared to the maximum potential build-out
17 under the former rule, the Amendments increase the maximum for
18 piers and buoys but reduce the cap on boat ramps and slips.²

19 The EIS recognizes that development of boating facilities

20
21 ² Although the prior code of ordinances did not set a
22 numerical limit on boating facilities that could be permitted, TRPA
23 estimated that the spatial prohibition would in effect allow the
24 total numbers (existing plus potential) to rise to 839 piers, 5,826
25 buoys, 128 ramps, and 3,144 slips. The Amendments permit a total
26 of 906 piers, 6,316 buoys, 43 ramps, and 2,929 slips. Compare AR
2:734 with 3:1189.

27 In this litigation, TRPA and the Shorezone Property Owners
28 argue that because the Amendments limit construction in ways beyond
29 the numeric cap it is unlikely that the full 128 additional private
30 piers will be constructed. The EIS, however, assumes that all 128
31 piers will be built.

1 could negatively impact air and water quality, recreational access,
2 scenery, and noise. The Amendments adopt measures to mitigate
3 these impacts, and the EIS concluded that these measures mitigate
4 impacts to a "less than significant" level. AR 1:1, 78-80. TRPA
5 concluded that as a result of this mitigation, the Amendments
6 satisfy the obligation to maintain and achieve thresholds. AR 1:1,
7 22-23. Plaintiffs argue that both of these conclusions were
8 arbitrary and capricious. Plaintiffs relatedly argue that the
9 unmitigated impacts will violate the obligation to avoid
10 degradation of the lake as an "Outstanding National Resource Water"
11 under the Clean Water Act.

12 **II. Standard**

13 The majority of plaintiffs' claims arise under the Compact
14 itself. The Compact provides a private cause of action for suits
15 alleging that TRPA's "act or decision has been arbitrary,
16 capricious or lacking substantial evidentiary support or [that] the
17 agency has failed to proceed in a manner required by law." Art.
18 VI(j)(5); see also Code § 6.2A. The parties characterize this
19 standard of review as essentially the same as that employed under
20 the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A),
21 (E); but see Comm. for Reasonable Regulation of Lake Tahoe, 311 F.
22 Supp. 2d at 989 (discussing the "substantial evidence" aspect of
23 the Compact standard).

24 As noted above, plaintiffs also argue that TRPA has violated
25 the Clean Water Act's anti-degradation policy for "Outstanding
26 National Resource Waters." The parties have not discussed the

1 cause of action authorizing this claim, but it appears that this
2 claim is brought under the Compact by virtue of the Compact's
3 incorporation of state and federal water quality guidelines. The
4 parties agree that the arbitrary and capricious standard applies
5 to this claim.

6 Suits challenging agency action under such standards generally
7 do not present factual disputes, and thus do not implicate the
8 ordinary standards for summary judgment. Conservation Cong. v.
9 U.S. Forest Serv., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1100 (E.D. Cal. 2008)
10 (citing Occidental Eng'g Co. v. INS, 753 F.2d 766, 769-70 (9th Cir.
11 1985)). An agency decision is arbitrary or capricious for purposes
12 of the APA where the agency "relied on factors Congress did not
13 intend it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important
14 aspect of the problem, or offered an explanation that runs counter
15 to the evidence before the agency or is so implausible that it
16 could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
17 agency expertise." Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 987 (9th
18 Cir. 2008) (en banc) (quotations omitted). The agency "must
19 articulate a rational connection between the facts found and the
20 conclusions reached." Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442
21 F.3d 1147, 1157 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Midwater Trawlers Co-op.
22 v. Env'tl. Def. Ctr., 282 F.3d 710, 716 (9th Cir. 2002)).

23 This standard is especially appropriate when reviewing factual
24 determinations that implicate an agency's scientific expertise.
25 Ariz. Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife, BLM, 273 F.3d
26 1229, 1236 (9th Cir. 2001). Even for scientific questions,

1 however, a court must intervene when the agency's determination is
2 counter to the evidence or otherwise unsupported. See, e.g.,
3 Sierra Club v. U.S. Env'tl. Prot. Agency, 346 F.3d 955, 962 (9th
4 Cir. 2003), amended by 352 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting
5 agency's factual conclusion about cause of air quality exceedance).

6 **III. Analysis**

7 Plaintiffs argue that adoption of the Amendments violated two
8 provisions of the Compact. First, the obligation to ensure that
9 the Code, as amended, implements the Regional Plan in a way that
10 will achieve and maintain the thresholds and second, the obligation
11 to ensure that the Amendments' adverse impacts were mitigated to
12 a "less than significant" level. For the reasons explained below,
13 TRPA's conclusion that the Amendments satisfy these two obligations
14 was arbitrary and capricious.

15 In a claim that is largely derivative of the above, plaintiffs
16 argue that the Amendments violated the Clean Water Act's
17 antidegradation policy for Outstanding National Resource Waters.
18 Because TRPA has not shown that the Amendments' water quality
19 impacts will be mitigated, TRPA's conclusion that the Amendments
20 comport with this policy was also arbitrary and capricious.

21 **A. The Obligation to Achieve and Maintain Thresholds**

22 TRPA's obligation to "achieve and maintain" the environmental
23 thresholds is reiterated throughout the Compact. In particular,
24 TRPA must ensure that "at a minimum, the [Regional Plan] and all
25 its elements, as implemented through agency ordinances, rules and
26 regulations, achieves and maintains" the thresholds. Compact art.

1 V(c); see also Code § 6.5. In adopting the Amendments, TRPA
2 concluded that this obligation was satisfied because the project
3 included mitigation measures that would ensure that the Amendments
4 had no significant adverse effects. AR 1:22-23.³ As to this, the
5 court states in part III(B) below, the predicate finding that the
6 project would not have significant impacts on air quality, water
7 quality, recreational access, and noise is arbitrary and
8 capricious.

9 More fundamentally, however, TRPA misunderstands the nature
10 of the obligation to achieve and maintain the thresholds. It is
11 not enough to show that the Amendments do not make the problem
12 worse. TRPA must ensure that the ordinances, as amended, implement
13 the regional plan in a way that will actually achieve the
14 thresholds. With regard to thresholds not presently in attainment,
15 TRPA's finding that the Amendments will not aggravate the problem
16 is inadequate.

17 **1. The "Achieve and Maintain" Obligations**

18 Three provisions of the Compact oblige TRPA to achieve and
19 maintain the thresholds. Article I(b) compels TRPA to "adopt and
20 enforce a regional plan and implementing ordinances which will
21 achieve and maintain [the thresholds] while providing opportunities
22 for orderly growth and development consistent with [them]."
23 Article V(c) provides that once TRPA adopts thresholds, TRPA must

24
25 ³ The court acknowledges that item 1 of TRPA's "Chapter 6
26 Findings" regarding the Amendments is ambiguously worded. The
court's interpretation of this finding is informed by the position
taken by TRPA in its briefing and at oral argument.

1 "amend the regional plan so that, at a minimum, the plan and all
2 its elements, as implemented through agency ordinances, rules and
3 regulations, achieves and maintains" the thresholds. In light of
4 these provisions, TRPA has adopted an ordinance specifying that
5 before the ordinances, rules, or other programs may be amended,
6 TRPA must find that, inter alia, "the Regional Plan and all of its
7 elements, as implemented through the Code, Rules and other TRPA
8 plans and programs, as amended, achieves and maintains the
9 thresholds." Code § 6.5. Finally, a third provision of the
10 Compact, which applies to "projects" in general rather than
11 specifically to the Regional Plan and ordinances, provides that
12 prior to approving any project, TRPA must conclude that the project
13 "will not adversely affect implementation of the regional plan and
14 will not cause the adopted environmental threshold carrying
15 capacities of the region to be exceeded." Compact art. V(g).

16 Under these provisions, amendments to the ordinances face a
17 higher burden than individual projects. In approving individual
18 projects, article V(g) merely requires that TRPA find that the
19 project will not cause any threshold to be "exceeded." Id. A
20 finding that the project will not make matters worse suffices under
21 this standard. Article V(g) applies to amendments to the
22 ordinances because an amendment is a "project" under the Compact.
23 Id. art. I(h). Such amendments are also subject to the higher
24 standard under Code § 6.5, however, which requires a finding that
25 "the Regional Plan . . . , *as implemented through the Code . . .*
26 *as amended*, achieves and maintains the thresholds." (emphasis

1 added). Section 6.5 explains that this finding is "in addition to"
2 the findings required for projects generally. Where a threshold
3 is not in attainment, a finding that the problem is not getting
4 worse does not satisfy this provision. Nor is it sufficient to
5 find that, metaphorically, the ball is moving forward. By
6 requiring that the Regional Plan be implemented so as to "achieve,"
7 rather than merely "approach," the thresholds, the Compact and
8 Ordinances require a finding that TRPA will make it to the goal.
9 TRPA is correct that Code section 6.5 looks to the entire package
10 of the regional plan, ordinances, etc., rather than to effects
11 specifically attributable to the proposed amendment. Thus, it does
12 not matter whether the proposal at issue will make the scoring
13 shot, or even whether it will be involved in the play. The key is
14 the finding that, one way or another, the thresholds will be
15 achieved.⁴

16 TRPA argues that this interpretation conflates the
17 requirements of Code sections 6.4 and 6.5. Code section 6.4
18 provides that before amending the Regional Plan, TRPA must find
19 "that the Regional Plan, as amended, achieves and maintains the
20

21 ⁴ In an argument raised for the first time in plaintiffs'
22 reply, plaintiffs argue that TRPA's failure to establish
23 "Reasonable Progress Lines" ("RPLs") for the thresholds precludes
24 a finding that the thresholds will be achieved. Pls.' Reply 2-3.
25 It may be that RPLs would facilitate achieving thresholds or
26 determining whether thresholds will be achieved. It may also be
that failure to establish RPLs is itself unlawful. The court does
not decide these issues. The court is not persuaded TRPA cannot
determine whether the thresholds will be attained without the
assistance of RPLs. If plaintiffs wish to challenge the failure
to establish RPLs, that is a claim for another lawsuit.

1 thresholds." The Compact and Code recognize that the Regional Plan
2 is not a complete regulatory scheme, as demonstrated by the
3 requirement that TRPA adopt ordinances and regulations in order to
4 implement the plan. See, e.g., Compact art. I(b), VI(a). Thus,
5 the section 6.4 finding is not a finding that the Regional Plan,
6 standing in isolation, will suffice to achieve the thresholds. The
7 Regional Plan must be implemented through ordinances, and the
8 details of that implementation matter. In this suit, plaintiffs
9 do not challenge the adequacy of the Regional Plan, implying the
10 view that although the Regional Plan *could* be implemented in a way
11 that would achieve the thresholds, the proposed implementation
12 falls short. Code section 6.5 recognizes the viability of this
13 type of argument by imposing on amendments to ordinances a
14 requirement that is separate from, but similar to, the requirement
15 for an amendment to the Regional Plan. See also Cal. ex rel. Van
16 De Kamp v. TRPA, 766 F.2d 1308, 1314 (9th Cir. 1985) (TRPA's
17 finding that project was consistent with the Regional Plan was
18 itself insufficient to satisfy the requirement imposed by Compact
19 art. V(g), notwithstanding TRPA's interpretation of the Compact to
20 the contrary.).

21 Finally, TRPA argues that this interpretation leads to an
22 absurd result. The language of the Compact and Code is clear in
23 this regard, and a party arguing that the court should depart from
24 the plain language on the basis of absurdity faces a heavy burden.
25 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Cal. PUC, 597 F.3d 958, 969 (9th Cir. 2010)
26 (citing Safe Air for Everyone v. Env'tl. Prot. Agency, 488 F.3d

1 1088, 1097 (9th Cir. 2007)), Cumbie v. Woody Woo, Inc., 596 F.3d
2 577, 582 (9th Cir. 2010). TRPA argues that it would be absurd to
3 prevent TRPA from amending the ordinances until all thresholds are
4 in attainment. The court agrees that this would be absurd, but the
5 plain language does not create such a prohibition. Section 6.5
6 does not require a finding that thresholds have been *achieved*, it
7 requires a finding that the amended ordinances implement the plan
8 in a way that *achieves* them. Many of the thresholds were set for
9 levels ambitiously more protective than then-prevailing conditions,
10 demonstrating a clear understanding that the thresholds would not
11 be immediately achieved. AR 29:19179-94. This was consistent with
12 the restorative purpose of the Compact. See, e.g., Compact art.
13 I(a)(7). Thus, TRPA may satisfy section 6.5 by finding that the
14 amended ordinances, etc., implement the Regional Plan in a way that
15 will achieve the thresholds in the future.⁵ In light of this
16 clarification, ascribing the plain meaning to "achieves," rather
17 than interpreting the word to mean "moves toward" or something
18 similar, does not produce a result so unworkable as to be absurd.⁶

19
20 ⁵ To be meaningful, the obligation to achieve the thresholds
21 must carry with it some requirement of timeliness. The scope of
22 this requirement is not relevant to this suit.

23 ⁶ Although the parties have not briefed the issue, it appears
24 that the States' choice of words was rational. TRPA acknowledges
25 that attainment of the thresholds will require both avoidance of
26 future harm and "repair [of] ongoing environmental damage through
restoration projects (correcting the 'sins of the past')." TRPA's
Brief at 3. The Shorezone Property Owners' brief demonstrates that
one way to correct these sins is by offering new piers as a
regulatory 'carrot' that incentivizes landowners to cure unrelated
existing damaging conditions. TRPA must have a finite number of
such carrots and sticks. Therefore, before changing the way in

1 **2. TRPA's Findings that The Regional Plan, As Implemented,**
2 **Would Achieve and Maintain the Thresholds**

3 Having clarified the scope of TRPA's duty, the court turns to
4 the individual thresholds. TRPA has promulgated thirty-six
5 distinct thresholds. See, e.g., AR 11:7207. Twelve of these
6 concern soil conservation, vegetation, fisheries or wildlife,
7 topics on which plaintiffs provide no argument or discussion. Of
8 the remaining twenty-four, many appear to have little connection
9 to motorized boating or boating facilities. These include, for
10 example, thresholds for wood smoke, tributary water quality, water
11 quality in other lakes, and aircraft noise. While plaintiffs refer
12 to some thresholds in this second group in passing, plaintiffs
13 provide no argument regarding the pertinence of these thresholds
14 to this suit. The parties have not addressed whether TRPA must
15 make findings regarding every threshold for every project or
16 amendment, e.g., whether TRPA may amend an aspect of the ordinances
17 dealing with boating without finding that the threshold for onshore
18 impervious coverage of soil is achieved. Because plaintiffs rest
19 their claims on thresholds argued to be affected by boating and
20 boating facilities, the court limits its analysis to those
21 thresholds.

22 So understood, plaintiffs invoke fourteen thresholds. These
23 are the air quality thresholds for carbon monoxide, ozone,
24 particulates, and atmospheric nutrients; water quality thresholds

25 _____
26 which TRPA employs these opportunities, TRPA must plan ahead to
ensure that the overall effect will attain the thresholds.

1 for winter clarity and phytoplankton; both recreation thresholds;
2 all four scenic thresholds; and noise thresholds for single events
3 and community noise. When the Amendments were adopted, the most
4 recent data on threshold attainment and trends was TRPA's "2006
5 Threshold Evaluation," dated September 2007. AR 11:7187. This
6 assessment concluded that of these fourteen thresholds, only the
7 two recreation thresholds were in attainment. AR 11:7207.

8 As noted above, TRPA based its achievement finding on the
9 conclusion that the Amendments would not have significant adverse
10 impacts. AR 1:21-22. For those thresholds that have not been
11 attained, Code § 6.5 requires more, i.e., a showing that something-
12 -whether the Amendments or something else--will provide the
13 necessary improvement. TRPA asserts that "TRPA could, if required,
14 find that the Regional Plan attains and achieves [the] thresholds."
15 TRPA Reply, at 4. In review of agency action, a finding that the
16 agency did not make cannot justify an agency decision, regardless
17 of whether the agency could have made the finding. "[A]n agency's
18 action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated by the
19 agency itself." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
20 Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983).

21 If the agency had actually made the requisite finding
22 elsewhere, that finding could have been incorporated by reference.
23 TRPA's decision did not refer to any such finding, AR 1:21-22, and
24 TRPA has not argued that such a finding exists. At most, TRPA
25 points to a resolution that sets target dates for attainment of
26 most thresholds. See TRPA's Second Request for Judicial Notice,

1 Ex. 2 (TRPA Resolution 2007-17). Mere setting of targets is not
2 the same as concluding that the agency has adopted a course of
3 action that will meet the targets, and TRPA has not argued that
4 this resolution constituted a determination that the ordinances,
5 etc., as they existed at the time of this resolution would
6 implement the plan so as to achieve the thresholds. Where the
7 court is brought to inquiring whether documents not referred to in
8 the challenged decision implied conclusions that the agency does
9 not attribute to them or any other document, the court has ventured
10 far beyond the bounds of arbitrary and capricious review.⁷

11 The recreational thresholds, however, present a different
12 question. The court ultimately concludes that TRPA's finding
13 regarding these thresholds was arbitrary and capricious, because
14 the court rejects TRPA's predicate finding that the Amendments
15 would not significantly adversely affect recreation, as explained
16 in part III(B)(3) below. Insofar as the court addresses the
17 recreational impacts as an alternative ground under the
18 counterfactual assumption that the impacts finding was proper, the
19 court cannot reject TRPA's attainment conclusion. The record
20 demonstrates that TRPA concluded that all recreational thresholds
21 were in attainment and that the trend for these thresholds was

22
23 ⁷ The court further notes that this resolution did not set a
24 target date for at least one of the thresholds at issue, Dkt. No.
25 113 at page 33 of 50, ("[t]here is no basis for prediction of a
26 [phytoplankton water quality threshold] attainment date, if
attainment is possible."), and that this resolution appears to
conflict in some ways with the concurrently-issued 2006 Threshold
Evaluation, compare id. at 12 of 50 with AR 11:7207 (whether the
trend for carbon monoxide levels is positive).

1 positive. AR 11:7207. This conclusion was not inconspicuous,
2 although this predicate determination should have been more clearly
3 referenced in the findings adopting the Amendments. Where the
4 threshold has already been attained and is not suffering a downward
5 trend, a finding that the amended ordinances will implement the
6 plan so as to preserve the status quo is all that Code § 6.5
7 requires.

8 Accordingly, TRPA arbitrarily and capriciously concluded that
9 the "the Regional Plan and all of its elements, as implemented
10 through the Code, Rules and other TRPA plans and programs, as
11 amended, achieves and maintains" the thresholds for carbon
12 monoxide, ozone, particulates, atmospheric nutrients; winter
13 clarity, phytoplankton, single event noise, community noise,
14 recreation and scenery. Code § 6.5. As to recreation, this
15 holding is predicated on the court's conclusion that TPRA failed
16 to demonstrate that the Amendments would not significantly
17 adversely affect recreation on the lake.

18 **B. The Obligation to Mitigate Adverse Impacts to a Less Than**
19 **Significant Level**

20 The Amendments were a "project" for which the Compact required
21 TRPA to prepare an "environmental impact statement" ("EIS").
22 Compact art. I(h), VII(a)(2). Pursuant to the EIS requirement,
23 TRPA could not approve the Amendments unless TRPA had "required"
24 or "incorporated" measures "which avoid or reduce the significant
25 adverse environmental effects to a less than significant level" or
26 ////

1 TRPA found such measures to be infeasible.⁸ Compact art.
2 VII(d)(1). There was no finding of infeasibility here.

3 Plaintiffs contend that for a variety of reasons, TRPA's
4 conclusion that there would be no significant impacts was arbitrary
5 and capricious. The court concludes that TRPA failed to support
6 its conclusions with regard to air, water, recreation, and noise,
7 but the court rejects plaintiffs' challenge to the determination
8 that the Amendments would not significantly adversely affect scenic
9 values.

10 **1. Challenge to the Baseline**

11 The EIS serves to identify "[t]he significant environmental
12 impacts of the proposed project," i.e., the impacts of what the
13 agency proposes to do. Compact art. VII(a)(2)(A). Under the
14 Amendments, TRPA proposes to, among other things, issue permits for
15 buoys in excess of those presently on the lake. TRPA separately
16 plans to identify the illegal buoys presently on the lake and
17 either issue permits for those buoys or to remove them while
18 authorizing others buoys to replace them. Plaintiffs argue that
19 the EIS masked the impacts of permitting or replacing unauthorized
20 buoys by including the existence of those buoys in the
21 environmental baseline even though TRPA's plan regarding existing
22 illegal buoys is an aspect of the proposed project. The court

23
24 ⁸ The version of the Compact ratified by the states includes
25 the word "than," although the version ratified by Congress does
26 not. As explained in the court's September 18, 2009 order issuing
a preliminary injunction, the court interprets the compact as
written above.

1 agrees.

2 **a. The EIS's Baseline and Treatment of Unauthorized**
3 **Buoys**

4 In discussing buoys, the EIS begins with the estimate that
5 4,454 buoys exist on the lake. AR 2:746. An unspecified number
6 of these buoys have not been permitted by TRPA. Id. The
7 Amendments approach these buoys as follows:

8 TRPA would first recognize all buoys
9 previously permitted by TRPA. Then, those
10 buoys that have been permitted by other
11 agencies with appropriate jurisdiction that
12 meet the TRPA location criteria would be
13 permitted. At this point, all other
14 unpermitted buoys on the lake would be
15 removed, unless the owners can clearly
16 demonstrate their buoys' existence in the Lake
17 prior to 1972. New buoy applications would
18 then be accepted from those littoral owners
19 who did not previously place unpermitted buoys
20 in the lake. No more than 4,454 buoys will be
21 allowed in the lake, until TRPA successfully
22 implements the Blue Boating Program.

23 Id. Although this plan contemplates identification of which buoys
24 are unpermitted (and thus the number of such buoys) the EIS does
25 not do so. Nor has TRPA explained why such identification will be
26 possible in the future but is not in the present.

 The "baseline" adopted by the EIS includes the existence of
all 4,454 existing buoys. See, e.g., AR 2:773-74.⁹ Plaintiffs

⁹ The EIS explains that it used 2002 in setting the baseline
of 4,454 existing buoys. AR 2:746. It is unclear which year TRPA
used for the baseline for other facilities. For example, in
discussing boat emissions in the Oct. 2008 Addendum to the EIS,
TRPA inconsistently refers to 2002 and 2004 as representing the
baseline. Compare AR 2:773 with AR 2:774. No party has explained
this difference or argued that it demonstrates any separate
impropriety.

1 argue that by incorporating existing unpermitted buoys into the
2 baseline, TRPA proposes to authorize buoys while disregarding the
3 effects of doing so. The EIS calculates the effects of the
4 Amendments by comparing the baseline conditions with the conditions
5 that will result from construction of all structures potentially
6 permitted by the Amendments. AR 2:773-74. This calculation is
7 used to determine the impacts that must be mitigated. Id. Thus,
8 while TRPA will issue permits for presently unpermitted buoys or
9 their replacements under the Amendments, the newly-permitted buoys'
10 effects are excluded from the amounts to be mitigated by the Blue
11 Boating and Adaptive Management Programs.

12 Separate from this baseline, the EIS describes a "no-action"
13 alternative under which TRPA would permit the maximum number of
14 buoys available under the prior version of the ordinances (i.e.,
15 under the prohibition on development in prime fish habitat). AR
16 2:680 (2008 EIS). At least some CEQA cases have endorsed the
17 practice of describing both existing conditions and likely future
18 conditions under existing policy. See, e.g., Woodward Park
19 Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Fresno, 150 Cal. App. 4th 683,
20 714 (2007). Here, under the EIS's no-action alternative the number
21 of buoys on the lake would rise to 5,826. AR 3:1889. The EIS
22 appears not to have used this no-action alternative in assessing
23 the effects of the Amendments. The parties have not directly
24 addressed the propriety of this no-action alternative or the
25 distinction drawn between it and the baseline.

26 ////

1 **b. Whether the Baseline Was Appropriate**

2 The court is not aware of any other case addressing a
3 challenge to the baseline used in an EIS prepared under the
4 Compact. In arguing over the propriety of the baseline here, the
5 parties cite a range of cases, primarily interpreting CEQA and
6 NEPA. To the extent that these cases apply here, they support the
7 conclusion that approval of unauthorized buoys or their
8 replacements is an aspect of the agency action and that inclusion
9 of existing unauthorized buoys in the baseline impermissibly
10 obscured this action's effects.¹⁰

11 Before turning to the cases, the court notes two governing
12 principles of statutory interpretation. First, cases interpreting
13 other statutes inform interpretation of the Compact only where
14 those cases rest on language analogous to that used in the Compact.
15 Glenbrook Homeowners Ass'n v. TRPA, 425 F.3d 611, 615-16 (9th Cir.
16 2005) (citing Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 309 (1957))
17 (explaining that NEPA regulations do not apply to the Compact).
18 Second, statutes must be interpreted in light of their context.
19 Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S.
20 644, ___, 127 S.Ct. 2518, 2534 (2007). This context includes both
21 the overall statutory scheme, id., as well as the statute's

22
23 ¹⁰ The statutes themselves are inapplicable. TRPA is not a
24 federal agency and therefore not subject to NEPA. Glenbrook
25 Homeowners Ass'n v. TRPA, 425 F.3d 611, 615 (9th Cir. 2005).
26 Although plaintiffs' complaint alleged that CEQA directly applies
to TRPA's actions in California, in the present motions plaintiffs
do not assert this theory of liability. See Compl. ¶ 70 (citing
California Dep't of Transp. v. City of South Lake Tahoe, 466 F.
Supp. 527, 537 (E.D. Cal. 1978)).

1 purpose, see, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmty. for a
2 Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 699 (1995), Cmty. for a Better Env't v.
3 City of Richmond, 184 Cal. App. 4th 70, 89 (2010) (citing Cmty.
4 for a Better Env't v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 48 Cal. 4th
5 310, 328 (2010)).¹¹ With these principles in mind, the court turns
6 to the cases cited by the parties.

7 The Compact requires that the EIS identify the effects of the
8 action. A "practical requirement" of this type of review is
9 identification of "baseline conditions . . . against which to
10 compare predictions of the effects of the proposed action." Am.
11 Rivers v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, 201 F.3d 1186, 1195 n.15 (9th
12 Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted). CEQA also requires that action be
13 measured against a baseline, also referred to as the "environmental
14 setting." Cmty. for a Better Env't, 48 Cal. 4th at 320.

15 Many CEQA cases have held that where the existing legal
16 framework (whether a license, plan, etc.) would permit development
17 or activity in excess of actual physical conditions, physical
18 conditions must be used as the baseline. First in this line of
19 cases is Environmental Planning & Information Council v. County of
20 El Dorado, 131 Cal. App. 3d 350, 358 (1982). In El Dorado, the
21 proposed project would have authorized development at a level
22 greatly in excess of that then existing but below the amount
23 authorized by the prior general plan. Id. The county used the

24
25 ¹¹ The court uses "Communities for a Better Environment" to
26 refer to the California Supreme Court's decision at 48 Cal. 4th
310, rather than the California Court of Appeal's decision at 184
Cal. App. 4th 70.

1 general plan as the baseline, giving the impression that the plan
2 would reduce development. Id. In deciding whether this was
3 permissible, the court noted that the purpose of environmental
4 review under CEQA was "to provide public agencies and the public
5 in general with detailed information about the effect which a
6 proposed project is likely to have on the environment" and, more
7 generally, "to afford the fullest possible protection to the
8 environment within the reasonable scope of the statutory language."
9 Id. at 354-55. From this perspective, the court rejected use of
10 the prior plan as the baseline, as this could "only mislead the
11 public as to the reality of the impacts and subvert full
12 consideration of the actual environmental impacts that would
13 result." Id. at 358. El Dorado was later used as the basis for
14 a CEQA guideline, which provides that the baseline will "normally"
15 be "the physical environmental conditions . . . as they exist . .
16 . at the time environmental analysis is commenced." CAL. CODE REGS.,
17 tit. 14, § 15125(a). The California Supreme Court recently
18 affirmed this line of cases and their use of this guideline in
19 Communities for a Better Environment. There, a refinery had
20 licenses to operate four boilers, each specifying a maximum
21 operating level. 48 Cal. 4th at 322. Although these licenses in
22 principle authorized all four boilers to simultaneously operate at
23 maximum capacity, this never occurred in practice. Id. Instead,
24 no boiler operated at the maximum level unless one or more other
25 boilers had been shut down for maintenance. Id. The Court
26 overturned an EIR that used the legally authorized but never

1 realized limit, rather than actual practice, as the environmental
2 baseline. "An approach using hypothetical allowable conditions as
3 the baseline results in 'illusory' comparisons that 'can only
4 mislead the public as to the reality of the impacts and subvert
5 full consideration of the actual environmental impacts,' a result
6 at direct odds with CEQA's intent." Id. (quoting El Dorado, 131
7 Cal. App. 3d at 358). (1983)).

8 Communities for a Better Environment recognized that three
9 California cases have allowed this sword to cut the other way. Id.
10 at 321 n.7 (citing Eureka Citizens for Responsible Gov't v. City
11 of Eureka, 147 Cal. App. 4th 357 (2007), Fat v. County of
12 Sacramento, 97 Cal. App. 4th 1270 (2002), Riverwatch v. County of
13 San Diego, 76 Cal. App. 4th 1428 (1999)). As characterized by the
14 Court, the Courts of Appeal in these cases had held that physical
15 conditions would "ordinarily" serve as the baseline even "where
16 actual development or activity had, by the time CEQA analysis was
17 begun, already exceeded that allowed under existing regulations."
18 Id. at 321. As explained above, the issue in Communities for a
19 Better Environment was the converse scenario, which implicated
20 separate concerns. The Court's analysis merely recognized these
21 opinions in passing without endorsing them.

22 In this case, TRPA primarily relies on Fat. In Fat, an
23 airport had operated without permits for decades. In reviewing a
24 permit for an expansion, the county used the airport's existing but
25 unauthorized condition as the baseline. Id. at 1278. The court
26 upheld this baseline, resting primarily on the ground that it

1 complied with the guideline. Id. at 1280-81. Insofar as Fat
2 simply rested on the text of the guideline, Fat carries little
3 weight here.

4 What Fat did not discuss was the fact that sub silentio
5 approval of existing unauthorized activity is in an important sense
6 an agency action. The Ninth Circuit has recognized this principle
7 under NEPA. Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Scarlett, 439 F. Supp.
8 2d 1074, 1105 (E.D. Cal. 2006) ("Scarlett"), aff'd by Friends of
9 Yosemite Valley v. Kempthorne, 520 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2008)
10 ("Friends"). In Friends, as with many NEPA cases, the baseline was
11 expressed as the "no-action" alternative. 520 F.3d at 1038 (using
12 these terms interchangeably). The EIS was invalid because every
13 alternative it considered, including the no-action alternative,
14 assumed the existence of projects that required agency
15 authorization but that the agency had not yet validly authorized.
16 Id. at 1037-38. The agency had previously authorized these
17 projects, but that authorization had been validated prior to
18 preparation of the EIS. Id. at 1030. The District Court observed
19 that by the time the EIS at issue was prepared many of these
20 projects had already been implemented and that "it would be
21 contrary to NEPA to pretend that [these projects were] not now part
22 of the status quo." Scarlett, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1105.
23 Nonetheless, because the projects had not been authorized and the
24 project at issue concerned, in part, whether to authorize them,
25 including these projects in the baseline wrongfully "'assume[d] the
26 existence of the very plan being proposed.'" Friends, 520 F.3d at

1 1038 (quoting Scarlett, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1105).

2 The concern in Friends is particularly relevant to the
3 Compact. Like CEQA and NEPA, the Compact serves to inform the
4 public and to protect the environment in a general sense. The
5 Compact goes further, however, by commanding TRPA to improve
6 environmental quality, in some instances dramatically, by setting
7 and attaining environmental thresholds. Removing unauthorized
8 buoys without authorizing replacements would apparently be one way
9 to make progress toward attainment of these thresholds. Forfeiture
10 of that opportunity is an action, rather than a perpetuation of the
11 status quo. Put differently, an agency may not escape its duty by
12 ignoring that duty and then presenting the result as a fait
13 accompli incorporated into an environmental baseline. See Swan
14 View Coalition v. Barbouletos, No. 6-73-M, 2008 WL 5682094, *16,
15 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56677 *45-46 (D. Mont. 2008) (taking this
16 view with respect to an analogous baseline issue under section 7
17 of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536).

18 This is not to say that the EIS should ignore the existing
19 effects of unauthorized action. Scarlett properly recognized that
20 damage resulting from existing but unauthorized projects must be
21 acknowledged in the EIS. Similarly, where the Bureau of Land
22 Management ("BLM") had allowed an illegal off-highway vehicle trail
23 network to develop over a period of decades, a Northern District
24 of California case held that using conditions as they existed in
25 1980 as the baseline, as plaintiffs there recommended, would
26 violate NEPA's purpose of providing complete and accurate

1 information about the effects of agency action. Ctr. for
2 Biological Diversity v. U.S. BLM, No. C 06-4884, 2009 U.S. Dist.
3 LEXIS 90016, *92 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2009) ("CBD v. BLM").¹²
4 Similarly, California courts have suggested that it would be
5 problematic to exclude unauthorized activity by using conditions
6 as they existed in the past as the baseline. Riverwatch, 76 Cal.
7 App. 4th at 1453 (discussing "early baselines"). It appears to the
8 court, however, that a baseline may reflect damage that has already
9 occurred as a result of illegal activity as well as the agency's
10 present ability and responsibility to limit perpetuation of that
11 harm through enforcement.

12 Two remaining California decisions have upheld use of a
13 baseline reflecting existing unauthorized activity, resting on
14 concerns that are inapplicable here. In the first, Riverwatch,
15 plaintiffs argued that the baseline should have excluded the
16 effects of past illegal land disturbance. 76 Cal. App. 4th at 1452.
17 The court rested on the county's conclusion that requiring the
18 county to determine whether these disturbances were legal, as a
19 prerequisite to determining whether to exclude them, would
20 "interfere [with], conflict [with,] or unfairly amplify" the
21 enforcement actions already undertaken by the Army Corps of
22 Engineers, the entity with jurisdiction over the issue. Id. at

23
24 ¹² CBD v. BLM held that enforcement after decades of inaction
25 was itself an agency action, upholding BLM's use of a baseline that
26 included continued use of at least some unauthorized roads. 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90016, *91-93. Although CBD v. BLM is a well-
reasoned opinion, for the reasons stated above the court does not
find this particular ground for decision persuasive in this case.

1 1453. The second, Eureka Citizens for Responsible Gov't, 147 Cal.
2 App. 4th 357, rested on Riverwatch and the language of the
3 guidelines to hold that even where the agency preparing the EIR is
4 the enforcement agency, addressing prior illegality through the EIR
5 process could interfere with enforcement efforts. 147 Cal. App.
6 4th at 370-71. In this case, TRPA has not argued that determining
7 the number of unauthorized buoys at this stage would interfere with
8 subsequent enforcement. Because enforcement action regarding all
9 unauthorized buoys is an aspect of the very project under
10 consideration here, such interference appears unlikely. Nor has
11 TRPA argued that information necessary to identify the number of
12 unauthorized buoys is unavailable. C.f. CBD v. BLM, 2009 U.S.
13 Dist. LEXIS 90016, *92 (explaining that records necessary to
14 determine which roads were illegal did not exist).

15 Finally, the facts of the project here are in an important way
16 distinct from those in any of the cited cases. In each of the
17 above cases, the issue was whether the agency could let sleeping
18 dogs lie. Here, TRPA proposes to act on its existing duty to
19 enforce permit requirements, to issue permits to only those
20 existing buoys that can otherwise be lawfully permitted, and to
21 remove the remaining buoys only to permit other unrelated buoys in
22 their place.

23 For these reasons, the court concludes that the EIS's use of
24 the number of existing buoys, rather than the number of existing
25 buoys authorized by TRPA, as the baseline, was contrary to the

26 ////

1 Compact and therefore arbitrary and capricious.¹³

2 Because TRPA calculated the effects of the action by reference
3 to this baseline, this error infects much of the entire EIS. For
4 example, TRPA's conclusion that the effects on air and water
5 quality would be mitigated to the point of insignificance was based
6 on an incorrect calculation of the magnitude of those effects. Use
7 of the inappropriate baseline therefore invalidates the EIS's
8 analysis of air quality, water quality, and noise.¹⁴ In order to
9 guide TRPA on remand, and in light of the possibility of appeal,
10 the court addresses the merits of plaintiffs' independent arguments
11 challenging the EIS. In order to do so the court assumes, contrary
12 to the above conclusion, that the EIS used a permissible baseline.

13 **2. TRPA's Finding that Impacts on Air and Water Quality**
14 **Would Be Less than Significant**

15 Independent of their challenge to the baseline, plaintiffs
16 argue that the EIS's discussion of mitigation is inadequate. The
17 court summarizes the EIS's calculation of air and water quality

18 ¹³ Alternatively, in light of the above concerns and TRPA's
19 failure to identify any discussion in the EIS of why this baseline
20 was chosen, the baseline is arbitrary and capricious in light of
21 TRPA's failure to consider an important aspect of the problem and
22 to articulate a rational connection between the facts found and
conclusions reached. McNair, 537 F.3d at 987, Earth Island Inst.,
442 F.3d at 1157.

23 ¹⁴ The baseline error does not appear to pertain to scenery or
24 recreation. The EIS concluded that additional buoys could impact
25 scenic values, but plaintiffs have neither challenged the EIS's
26 conclusion that these impacts would be mitigated nor asserted that
the baseline error implicates the scenery analysis. Because the
recreation analysis did not discuss buoys in any detail, the
baseline error with respect to buoys is not itself a ground for
rejecting the recreation analysis.

1 impacts and the adopted mitigation thereof. The court then
2 addresses the sufficiency of this mitigation from the NEPA
3 perspective. Although the NEPA caselaw generally corresponds with
4 the CEQA standards, the court separately addresses TRPA's
5 contention that under CEQA, an agency may offer a commitment to
6 achieving specific performance standards in lieu of other
7 discussion of mitigation. The court concludes that TRPA has
8 misinterpreted the CEQA caselaw and that the EIS is inadequate
9 whether viewed from the CEQA or NEPA perspective. Accordingly,
10 the court does not address whether the Compact's EIS provision,
11 when interpreted in light of the Compact's extensive substantive
12 requirements, imposes requirements beyond those imposed by CEQA or
13 NEPA with respect to this issue.

14 **a. Potential Impacts on Air and Water Quality**

15 The EIS asserts that construction of boating facilities
16 authorized by the Amendments will induce additional motorized
17 boating and that emissions from this boating will, if unmitigated,
18 adversely affect air and water quality.¹⁵

19 The EIS provides numeric estimates of these impacts. In
20 deriving these estimates, the EIS first estimates that once the
21 maximum number of facilities permitted by the Amendments is
22 constructed there will be 294,895 motorized "boat trips" each year,
23

24 ¹⁵ The EIS acknowledges that other aspects of the Shorezone
25 Amendments, such as dredging and effects of development in the
26 backshore, will also impact air and water quality. AR 2:774, 779.
Plaintiffs' present motion does not challenge the EIS with regard
to these impacts or mitigation thereof.

1 an increase of approximately 62,686 annual trips over the baseline.
2 AR 2:774. The EIS acknowledges that the rate at which these trips
3 are added will not be uniform, but explains that averaged over the
4 time it will take for new facilities to be constructed, every year
5 there will be 2,850 more boat trips than there were in the year
6 prior. Id. Absent mitigation, these 62,686 additional boat trips
7 will impair water quality by annually depositing into the lake an
8 additional 177 tons of hydrocarbons, 318 tons of nitrous oxides,
9 0.046 tons of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, and 7.8 tons of
10 particulate matter. AR 2:774. These trips will similarly impact
11 air quality by annually emitting into the atmosphere an additional
12 17 tons of nitrous oxides, 51 tons of reactive organic gasses, 4
13 tons of particulate matter, and 400 tons of carbon monoxide. AR
14 7:789.¹⁶ Plaintiffs do not challenge the propriety of these
15 estimates. Pls.' Statement of Undisputed Facts ("SUF") ¶ 25.

16 The EIS asserts that even if no further boating facilities
17 were approved the number of annual motorized boat trips would
18 nonetheless increase. AR 2:774, 788. This "background" growth is
19 included in the estimates above. AR 2:774. TRPA now argues that
20 because this background growth is not attributable to the effects
21 of the project, the above figures do not represent the project's
22 impacts. TRPA'S Response to Pls.' SUF, ¶¶ 25c, 25e. The court
23 disregards this argument as contrary to the EIS's stated position.
24 The EIS acknowledged this issue, incorporated this background

25
26 ¹⁶ Some pollutants appear on both lists because boats emit these pollutants directly into both the air and water. AR 7:787.

1 growth into the numeric values anyway, and explicitly stated that
2 those values represented the impacts that the project was required
3 to address, avoid, or mitigate. AR 2:773-74.¹⁷ The EIS expresses
4 this requirement by stating that for each year, TRPA must avoid or
5 mitigate the emissions resulting from that year's expected increase
6 in boating. Id.

7 **b. Proposed Measures to Avoid and Reduce Air and Water**
8 **Quality Impacts**

9 The EIS concludes that the above impacts of motorized boating
10 will be mitigated by the Blue Boating Program and by increased
11 enforcement--funded by buoy fees--of existing "no wake" zones and
12 a 7 mph boating speed limit in the Emerald Bay region of the lake.
13 AR 2:775-77, 788-91, see also Code §§ 54.13.2, 54.14. These
14 programs will be implemented and refined pursuant to the Shorezone
15 Adaptive Management Program. Code § 54.16.

16 TRPA primarily relies on the Blue Boating Program, which the
17 Amendments establish under Code § 54.15. TRPA summarizes this
18 program as involving four elements pertinent to air and water
19 quality, which invoke a mixture of regulatory tools. First, the
20 Blue Boating Program will impose substantive requirements on engine
21 tuning, bilge water, and sewage management. Code §§ 54.15.A(2),
22 (4)-(5). The Amendments call for the creation of "programs" that
23 will impose these requirements but do not describe the requirements

24 ¹⁷ Alternatively, if the court were to accept TRPA's
25 litigation position and conclude that the figures did not state the
26 effects of the action, the EIS would be invalid for failing to
provide a statement of those effects.

1 themselves. Second, the Blue Boating Program calls for a
2 "mitigation fee program" to be used to "implement additional
3 pollution control measures." Code § 54.15.A(7). The third element
4 is a "boat certification program," which will implement the first
5 two elements. The certification program will "requir[e] operators
6 of motorized watercraft . . . to certify compliance with Blue
7 Boating Program requirements through a registration and sticker
8 program." Code § 54.15.A(1). Operators will be required to
9 purchase these stickers, with the fee for any boat's sticker to be
10 calculated under "an engine rating system designed to promote use
11 of cleaner engines." Id. Thus, the sticker program provides an
12 incentive for boaters to limit their impacts and also provides fees
13 for other mitigation programs. Fourth and finally, the Blue
14 Boating Program calls for water quality monitoring, education, and
15 enforcement programs that will implement the above. Code §§
16 54.14.A(6), (8)-(9).

17 The EIS and other documents included in the administrative
18 record provide few additional details regarding the Blue Boating
19 Program. A "Blue Boating Fact Sheet" incorporated in the EIS
20 proposes a preliminary schedule of sticker fees based on engine
21 horsepower and estimates that the sticker fees will initially
22 generate \$570,000 annually, of which an estimated \$400,000 will be
23 available for mitigation efforts. AR 2:829, 831. TRPA has not
24 identified any discussion in the record, however, of particular
25 potential mitigation efforts. The engine tuning requirement will
26 require that engines be tuned to reduce emissions as appropriate

1 to the lake's elevation without explaining what this involves. AR
2 2:830. The sewage management program will involve prohibiting
3 sewage discharge, informing boaters of this prohibition, and
4 providing free alternative sewage disposal at marinas. Id. The
5 clean bilge program will impose unspecified bilge water
6 requirements and provide boaters with sponges to absorb
7 contaminants. Id.

8 The Amendments and EIS acknowledge that the Blue Boating
9 Program is incomplete, and the Amendments provide a schedule for
10 implementation. TRPA's executive director must present a plan for
11 implementation of the Blue Boating Program by March 2009 and TRPA's
12 governing board ("Board") must adopt an implementation plan by
13 March 31, 2010. Code § 54.15.B(1). If the Board does not adopt
14 a plan on that date, TRPA may not "accept for processing any new
15 application for an additional pier, boat lift, buoy, boat slip, or
16 boat ramp, or for the expansion of an existing pier." Code §
17 54.15.B(3). All motorized watercraft are prohibited from operating
18 on the lake after May 1, 2010, unless the boat has obtained a
19 sticker under the Blue Boating Program. Code § 54.15.B(2).¹⁸
20 Finally, TRPA is prohibited from issuing permits for buoys beyond
21 the 4,454 included in the baseline until the Blue Boating Program
22 is in place. Code § 54.4.F(1). Separate from the schedule
23 provided in the Amendments themselves, the EIS explains that the
24

25 ¹⁸ For the reasons stated in note 1, supra, the court does not
26 address whether implementation has in fact proceeded according to
this schedule.

1 first step in the implementation of the Blue Boating Program will
2 be to inventory all boats entering the lake and that completion of
3 the Blue Boating Program will be integrated into the process for
4 calculating the Total Maximum Daily Loads for pollutants under the
5 Clean Water Act. AR 2:828-31.

6 Separate from the Blue Boating Program, the EIS states that
7 air and water quality emissions from motorized boating will be
8 reduced using the \$175 annual fee levied on each buoy. AR 3:1950.
9 The final EIS stated that half of these fees will fund watercraft
10 and buoy compliance and monitoring, thirty percent will fund water
11 quality monitoring, and the remaining twenty percent will go to
12 "Shoreland scenic improvement projects on public lands." AR 2:867-
13 68, c.f. AR 3:1950. One component of the watercraft compliance
14 will be increased enforcement of existing "no wake" zones and a low
15 speed limit in the Emerald Bay portion of the lake. AR 2:756. The
16 EIS explained that this would lessen impacts because emissions are
17 decreased when boats operate at lower speeds. AR 3:1956, 6:3656.

18 Finally, all mitigation programs are subject to review and
19 revision pursuant to the Shorezone Adaptive Management Program.
20 Code § 54.16. The core of this program is the requirement that
21 TRPA annually consider the prior year's activity and the
22 effectiveness of mitigation in that year. Code § 54.16.B, TRPA's
23 Brief at 8. This includes monitoring whether projects were
24 implemented as permitted, whether actions have had their predicted
25 effects, and whether any larger trends are occurring. AR 2:882.
26 If the "impacts of the new shorezone projects and any attendant

1 increases in motorized watercraft traffic" have not been mitigated,
2 TRPA's executive director must recommend that TRPA's governing
3 board take supplemental measures to ensure full mitigation,
4 including but not limited to:

5 (1) A moratorium on further approval of
6 shorezone projects.

7 (2) Modification of the criteria for approval
8 of shorezone projects.

9 (3) A limitation on boat launches at peak
10 times or other restrictions on motorized
11 watercraft traffic.

12 (4) A prohibition of lower-rated watercraft
13 engines.

14 Code § 54.16.C. Separately, beginning March 31, 2012, if the
15 annual report determines that the "performance measures identified
16 in the [EIS]" have not been attained then a moratorium on approvals
17 of boating facilities will automatically be imposed, unless the
18 failure to achieve the performance measure "is not attributable to
19 the approval of new shorezone projects, and all environmental
20 impacts of those projects have been fully mitigated." Code §
21 54.16.D.¹⁹

22 The Shorezone Property Owners argue that aspects of the
23 Amendments not directly related to boating provide still further

24 ¹⁹ Section 54.16.C refers to whether the effects have been
25 fully mitigated, whereas § 54.16.D refers specifically to
26 "performance measures." It appears that the performance measures
include surrogates for environmental harm that is difficult to
measure directly. AR 3:1835-41, 7:4215-16. No party has briefed
the relationship between sections C and D, but the details of this
relationship do not appear pertinent to this case.

1 mitigation of the impacts of boating facilities and motorized
2 boating. For example, the Shorezone Property Owners point to
3 regulations imposed on shorezone properties aimed at eliminating
4 preventable runoff within the shorezone in order to improve the
5 lake's water clarity. See Code § 54.4.C (requiring implementation
6 of Best Management Practices), § 52.2.2(e) (a property is eligible
7 for a new pier only if it has complied with said practices). The
8 EIS did not, however, refer to any of these programs or their
9 benefits as potentially offsetting the effects of boating and
10 boating facilities. "[A]n agency's action must be upheld, if at
11 all, on the basis articulated by the agency itself." Motor Vehicle
12 Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 50. Because TRPA did not identify these
13 additional measures as pertinent to the question of whether
14 increased boating would have adverse environmental impacts, the
15 court does not decide whether TRPA could have adopted the Shorezone
16 Property Owners' approach.

17 **c. Whether TRPA's Finding of No Significant Impacts on**
18 **Air and Water Quality Was Arbitrary or Capricious**

19 The EIS concluded that the above mitigation measures satisfied
20 the Compact's requirement that "the significant adverse
21 environmental effects" on increased boating on air and water
22 quality be reduced "to a less than significant level." Compact
23 art. VII(d)(1). In closely related arguments, plaintiffs argue
24 that the mitigation measures are so indefinite that it was
25 arbitrary and capricious to conclude that the measures would have
26 this effect and that the EIS improperly relies on mitigation

1 measures that will be imposed after the harm has occurred.

2 The parties cite an extensive range of NEPA and CEQA cases
3 regarding requirements for discussion of mitigation under those
4 statutes. After reviewing these lines of authority, the court
5 concludes that their requirements are equivalent for purposes of
6 the dispute here. Because TRPA did not conclude that mitigation
7 was infeasible, the Compact required "written findings" that
8 "changes or alterations" will "avoid or reduce" environmental harm
9 to insignificance, and these findings "must be supported by
10 substantial evidence." Compact art. VII(d)(1). This obligation
11 requires, at a minimum, a "reasonably complete" discussion of
12 mitigation measures including "analytical data" regarding whether
13 the available measures would achieve the required result.
14 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 352
15 (1989), Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 510 F.3d 1016, 1029 (9th Cir.
16 2007). TRPA failed to provide such a discussion here.

17 **i. NEPA's Requirements for Discussion of**
18 **Mitigation**

19 Unlike the Compact, NEPA does not compel avoidance of
20 environmental harm. Nonetheless, discussion of mitigation occurs
21 in two NEPA contexts. Most prominently, an EIS prepared under NEPA
22 must discuss possibilities for mitigation. Methow Valley, 490 U.S.
23 at 352. Methow Valley found this obligation to be inherent in
24 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(ii), which requires a detailed statement of
25 "any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
26 the proposal be implemented." The Compact uses essentially

1 identical language in Article VII(a)(2)(B). Separately, an agency
2 may discuss mitigation as part of a "Finding of No Significant
3 Impact" ("FONSI"). An agency may prepare a FONSI in lieu of an EIS
4 where proposed action will not have significant effects on the
5 environment. See Bosworth, 510 F.3d at 1018; 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9.
6 A FONSI may issue where the project inherently imposes no
7 significant effects or where the project's effects will be
8 mitigated to an insignificant level. Wetlands Action Network v.
9 U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 222 F.3d 1105, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000);
10 Friends of Payette v. Horseshoe Bend Hydroelectric Co., 988 F.2d
11 989, 993 (9th Cir. 1993).

12 As a threshold issue, although the parties suggest that the
13 EIS and FONSI lines of cases impose differing standards on
14 mitigation discussions, it is not clear that this is so. For
15 example, Methow Valley articulated the requirements for discussion
16 of mitigation in an EIS. 490 U.S. at 352. In Wetlands Action
17 Network, the court held that mitigation measures adopted in support
18 of a FONSI were sufficient, resting this conclusion in part on the
19 fact that the mitigation plan satisfied Methow Valley. 222 F.3d
20 at 1121-22. The parties here have not identified any clear
21 distinction between the standards imposed in these two contexts.²⁰

22 Under NEPA, discussion of mitigation must be "reasonably
23

24 ²⁰ If, contrary to this court's understanding, the EIS and
25 FONSI cases diverge, it is the latter that have greater relevance
26 to the Compact. Issuance of a mitigated FONSI, like the Compact,
requires not only that mitigation be discussed but also that
mitigation be sufficient to reduce impacts to insignificance.

1 complete" and detailed enough to "ensure that environmental
2 consequences have been fairly evaluated." Methow Valley, 490 U.S.
3 at 352. Even in the FONSI context, where the agency not only
4 describes but implements mitigation, "the agency is not required
5 to develop a complete mitigation plan detailing the 'precise nature
6 of the mitigation measures,' [although] the proposed mitigation
7 measures must be 'developed to a reasonable degree.'" Nat'l Parks
8 & Conservation Ass'n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722, 734 (9th Cir. 2001)
9 (quoting Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1121), abrogated on
10 other grounds by Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, ___ U.S. ___,
11 ___ 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2757 (2010).

12 A necessary aspect of a "reasonably complete" discussion is
13 an assessment of the efficacy of the mitigation measures
14 considered. Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest Service,
15 137 F.3d 1372, 1381 (9th Cir. 1998). Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain
16 held that an EIS was inadequate because, among other things, it did
17 not "provide[] an estimate of how effective the [discussed]
18 mitigation measures would be if adopted, or give[] a reasoned
19 explanation as to why such an estimate is not possible." Id. The
20 Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that NEPA requires "analytical
21 data" describing mitigation's effectiveness. Bosworth, 510 F.3d
22 at 1029, League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mts. Biodiversity
23 Project v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1192 (9th Cir. 2002), Babbitt,
24 241 F.3d at 734, Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146,
25 1151 (9th Cir. 1998). "A perfunctory description or mere listing
26 of mitigation measures, without supporting analytical data," is

1 inadequate. Babbitt, 241 F.3d at 734 (internal quotations
2 omitted).

3 Even where the precise contours of the proposed action had not
4 yet been determined, EIS's upheld by the Ninth Circuit discussed
5 the effectiveness of particular mitigation measures. N. Alaska
6 Envtl. Ctr. v. Kempthorne, 457 F.3d 969 979 (9th Cir. 2006)
7 concerned lease of federal lands for oil exploration and drilling.
8 Because the precise location of drilling could not yet be
9 determined, the EIS's discussion of mitigation was necessarily
10 general rather than site-specific. Id. at 973, 979. Nonetheless,
11 BLM's mitigation analysis discussed a range of mitigating
12 requirements, procedures, practices and design features that could
13 be incorporated into the leases, including a discussion of the
14 effectiveness of each of these options. Id. at 979. Okanogan
15 Highlands Alliance v. Williams, 236 F.3d 468 (9th Cir. 2000)
16 concerned a proposed mine whose precise water quality impacts were
17 uncertain. The EIS's "mitigating measures [were] described in
18 general terms and rel[ied] on general processes, not on specific
19 substantive requirements." Id. at 477. The EIS nonetheless
20 included an extensive discussion of specific measures that could
21 be used to mitigate each potential impact, id. at 474-75, including
22 an evaluation of the probable effectiveness of each measure, id.
23 at 474, 477.

24 Here, the EIS's discussion of mitigation violates this
25 standard. Beginning with the Blue Boating Program, TRPA has not
26 directed the court to any discussion of the potential efficacy of

1 any of the program's elements, much less any "analytical data" on
2 this issue. Even more glaring, although TRPA represents that a
3 significant aspect of the Blue Boating Program will be the use of
4 sticker fees to fund further mitigation measures, the EIS is silent
5 as to how this money might be spent.²¹ TRPA cannot blindly assume
6 that money will solve its problems. There is no discussion of the
7 types of projects that could be funded, of the benefits such
8 projects might provide, or of whether the funding projected to be
9 available under the sticker program will be sufficient to fund the
10 needed mitigation.

11 The buoy fee program, unlike the sticker fee program, at least
12 includes some discussion of how fees may be spent. A portion of
13 fees will be used to fund watercraft enforcement, including speed
14 limits in Emerald Bay and the no-wake zone. The EIS contains some
15 analytic data regarding the amount by which an individual boat's
16 emissions are reduced when the boat operates at a reduced speed.
17 AR 3:1956, 6:3656. The mere inclusion of some quantitative data,
18 however, does not render the discussion of mitigation measures
19 sufficient. The EIS does not discuss the ultimate issue, the
20 amount by which aggregate emissions could be reduced by increased
21 enforcement. It appears that any such discussion would require
22 some mention of what fraction of boating occurs in the areas
23

24
25 ²¹ The most detailed statement cited by TRPA is that sticker
26 fees might fund "strategies . . . includ[ing] particulate matter
as well as aquatic invasive species." AR 2:830-31.

1 subject to these limits²² and the number of boats presently
2 operating in violation of these limits, issues on which the EIS is
3 silent. Because the EIS contains no discussion of whether and how
4 the Blue Boating Program and buoy fees will suffice to offset the
5 air and water quality impacts of increased boating, the EIS failed
6 to take the "hard look" required under NEPA. Methow Valley, 490
7 U.S. at 350.

8 The Adaptive Management Program does not fill these gaps.
9 Although the Adaptive Management Program lists various measures
10 that would presumably reduce environmental impacts, the description
11 of these measures in the Code is a "perfunctory description or mere
12 listing of mitigation measures[]" without supporting analytical
13 data." Babbitt, 241 F.3d at 734. TRPA has not identified any
14 further discussion of these measures elsewhere in the EIS.

15 TRPA's conclusion that adaptive management is a sound policy
16 particularly suited to management of the Lake Tahoe region appears
17 well reasoned and prudent, and is entitled to deference.
18 Nonetheless, the Compact requires both that TRPA mitigate the
19 project's effects and that TRPA provide an EIS discussing the
20 measures TRPA will use to do so. In light of these obligations,
21 TRPA must implement adaptive management by providing in the EIS a
22 proposal for mitigation that is already reasonably complete but
23 that will be subject to later adaptation. Principles of adaptive
24

25 ²² Because the speed limit is imposed only in Emerald Bay it
26 appears the speed limit and no wake zone encompass a small fraction
of the lake.

1 management support leaving open the possibility, recognized in the
2 NEPA caselaw, of a future change in mitigation strategy, but
3 adaptive management does not provide a justification for postponing
4 altogether the discussion of mitigation measures. The court
5 therefore rejects TRPA's argument that the EIS complies with the
6 Compact because TRPA will "go slow" to ensure that mitigation
7 measures are developed and implemented before harm occurs. Even
8 assuming that this approach will avoid harm, it deprives the public
9 of the opportunity to meaningfully comment on mitigation measures
10 prior to the project's approval.²³

11 ////

12 _____
13 ²³ Moreover, the court is skeptical, at least, as to whether
14 the Amendments and EIS demonstrate that no harm will occur prior
15 to implementation of the Blue Boating Program. Although "new"
16 buoys (those in excess of 4,454) will not be authorized until the
17 Blue Boating Program is implemented and only five piers
18 applications may be submitted annually, authorization of
19 replacement buoys and construction of ramps and boat slips is
20 unthrottled. Although the adaptive management program is
21 immediately effective, it is also reactive, imposing measures once
22 the previous year's mitigation efforts have been shown to be
23 inadequate.

24 TRPA argues that although the adaptive management program is
25 backward looking, the annual evaluations will allow reaction before
26 impacts become significant because the each year boating emissions
will increase by at most by one percent. TRPA's Reply, 9 (citing
AR 2:774). On the factual question, the EIS states that the
increase will be one percent per year on average, but acknowledges
that the rate of increase will fluctuate. The EIS does not address
whether initial construction of ramps and slips will front-load the
increase. On the legal question, it appears that even a one
percent increase may be significant in light of non-attainment of
Compact thresholds and TRPA's acknowledgment of the limited number
of tools available to secure attainment. Admittedly, where an
agency determines in an EIS that an impact is insignificant, the
agency's interpretation of significance receives some deference.
Here, however, TRPA cites to no discussion in the EIS of whether
a one percent increase is significant.

1 **ii. Whether The Mitigation of Air and Water Quality**
2 **Impacts Satisfies CEQA**

3 Like the Compact, CEQA requires that where a proposed project
4 would have significant environmental effects, the project cannot
5 be approved unless “[c]hanges or alterations have been required in,
6 or incorporated into, [the] project which mitigate or avoid the
7 significant environmental effects thereof” or the agency determines
8 that mitigation is unfeasible. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081. In
9 general, the obligation to describe mitigation under CEQA parallels
10 the obligation under NEPA, notwithstanding CEQA’s substantive
11 requirement. The court addresses CEQA separately solely to discuss
12 TRPA’s invocation of Sacramento Old City Ass’n v. City Council, 229
13 Cal. App. 3d 1011, 1029 (1991) (“SOCA”). TRPA argues that SOCA
14 established that

15 [an] agency can commit itself to eventually
16 devising measures that will satisfy specific
17 performance criteria articulated at the time
18 of project approval. Where future action to
19 carry a project forward is contingent on
 devising means to satisfy such criteria, the
 agency should be able to rely on its
 commitment as evidence that significant
 impacts will in fact be mitigated.

20 TRPA’s brief at 15. TRPA mischaracterizes SOCA, which does not
21 permit the delayed implementation of mitigation measures TRPA
22 proposes here.

23 TRPA’s error stems from omission of the preface to the above
24 passage from SOCA. The first sentence is preceded by the
25 limitation “for kinds of impacts for which mitigation is known to
26 be feasible, but where practical considerations prohibit devising

1 such measures early in the planning process (e.g., at the general
2 plan amendment or rezone stage) . . .” SOCA, 229 Cal. App. 3d at
3 1029.²⁴ The importance of these qualifiers is illustrated by SOCA
4 itself. SOCA concerned a CEQA challenge to the City of
5 Sacramento’s expansion of the Sacramento Convention Center. This
6 expansion would require, at most, 2,621 additional parking spaces,
7 and the EIR stated that “overall level of parking utilization in
8 the study area should not exceed 90 percent.” Id. at 1020, 1022.
9 These were “specific performance criteria” that the City committed
10 to meeting, but the court did not rest on these facts. Instead,
11 the court extensively discussed the EIR’s evaluation of seven
12 potential measures to mitigate this impact, including possible
13 methods of implementation and results achievable by at least some
14 of the measures. Id. at 1020, see also id. at 1030 (describing the
15 EIR’s discussion of these alternatives as “extensive”). In light
16 of this discussion, the court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that
17 the EIR was required to provide specific mitigation measures. Id.
18 at 1026, 1030. Because the City had shown that impacts could and
19 would be mitigated, CEQA was satisfied.

20 Subsequent cases have confirmed this reading of SOCA. “SOCA
21 stands for the proposition that when a public agency has evaluated
22 the potentially significant impacts of a project *and has*
23 *identified measures that will mitigate those impacts*, the agency
24

25 ²⁴ TRPA also omits the fact that the entire passage is taken
26 from SOCA’s quotation of a treatise, Remy et al., Guide to the Cal.
Environmental Quality Act 200-201 (1991 ed.).

1 does not have to commit to any particular mitigation measure in the
2 EIR, as long as it commits to mitigating the significant impacts
3 of the project.” Cal. Native Plant Soc’y v. City of Rancho
4 Cordova, 172 Cal. App. 4th 603, 621 (2009) (emphasis added).
5 “[T]he sufficiency of the information contained in an EIR is
6 reviewed in light of what is reasonably feasible,” and SOCA applies
7 where “devising more specific mitigation measures . . . is
8 impractical.” Rio Vista Farm Bureau Ctr. v. County of Solano, 5
9 Cal. App. 4th 351, 375, 377 (1992). Both Cal. Native Plant Soc’y
10 and Rio Vista upheld EIRs under SOCA where the EIR offered a
11 mitigation plan that merely lacked site-specific details. Cal.
12 Native Plant Soc’y, 172 Cal. App. 4th at 610, 623 (EIR did not
13 specify where off-site habitat mitigation would occur), Rio Vista,
14 5 Cal. App. 4th at 366-67 (EIR did not specify site for future
15 waste management facility).

16 For the reasons stated in the prior section, the EIS does not
17 demonstrate that mitigation is feasible. SOCA allows an agency to
18 defer selection of a particular mitigation plan only when there is
19 reason to believe that at least some available plan will work.
20 TRPA also has provided no explanation as to why it would have been
21 impractical to provide the missing detail in the EIS.²⁵
22 Accordingly, assuming that SOCA and its progeny apply to EISs
23

24 ²⁵ Finally, the project is not fully contingent on achieving
25 goals, as stated in footnote 24. Fed’n of Hillside & Canyon Ass’ns
26 v. City of Los Angeles, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1252, 1262 (2000) (SOCA
inapplicable absent “a binding commitment to implement the
mitigation measures.”).

1 prepared under the Compact, these cases do not alter the court's
2 conclusion that the EIS here is inadequate.

3 **3. Mitigation of Recreational Impacts**

4 Plaintiffs separately challenge the EIS's finding that the
5 Amendments would not have significant adverse impacts on
6 recreational uses in the lake, including attainment of the
7 recreational thresholds. The EIS acknowledged that piers can
8 interfere with recreational uses, including use by pedestrians on
9 the shore, AR 2:783, and use by boaters traveling near the shore,
10 AR 2:785. The EIS concluded new piers authorized by the Amendments
11 would not significantly adversely affect these recreational uses
12 because (a) measures would minimize the impacts of new piers and
13 (b) remaining impacts of new piers would be mitigated through
14 removal of existing barriers to access.²⁶ The court concludes that
15 TRPA failed to support this finding. The court separately
16 concludes that TRPA was required to at least discuss the potential
17 recreational impacts of additional buoys.

18 **a. Measures to Limit The Impacts of Individual Piers**

19 The EIS recognizes that factors such as the design and
20 location of a pier influence the degree to which the pier impedes
21

22 ²⁶ The EIS also found that the Amendments would further other
23 types of recreational uses, such as motorized boating itself. TRPA
24 has not argued, however, that the finding of no adverse impact
25 rested on the conclusion that the benefits of improvements to that
26 type of access outweigh any harm to non-motorized recreational
uses. The court therefore does not address whether such a
conclusion would have been permissible. The court's review is
limited to TRPA's conclusion that non-motorized recreation would
be unimpaired.

1 recreational access. The Amendments imposes several design and
2 siting criteria. The Amendments generally prohibit construction
3 of piers in the forty percent of the lakeshore designated as
4 Shorezone Preservation Areas, areas in which pier construction
5 would have particularly significant recreational impacts. AR
6 2:754. TRPA notes that a new pier cannot be constructed within
7 fifty feet of an existing pier. AR 2:739. The Amendments prohibit
8 storage under or alongside piers, facilitating public passage under
9 the piers. Code § 51.2.G.

10 In addition to these substantive requirements, TRPA argues
11 that it may rely on the California State Lands Commission ("CSLC")
12 to ensure that new piers will not violate rights of public access
13 protected by California's public trust doctrine. CSLC is charged
14 with interpreting and enforcing the California public trust. Nat'l
15 Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Ct., 33 Cal. 3d 419 (1983). TRPA
16 contends that no new pier can be permitted in California absent
17 CSLC's separate approval, and neither plaintiffs nor CSLC have
18 disputed this contention. See Code § 54.5.A(1)(d) (no new pier
19 will be permitted unless it reaches a bottom elevation of 6219
20 feet), CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6301 (stating that CSLC has exclusive
21 jurisdiction over submerged lands), § 6321 (CSLC may authorize
22 construction over submerged lands). It follows, TRPA argues, that
23 no pier will be constructed in violation of the California public
24 trust.

25 TRPA must avoid impacting recreational access, including
26 impacts to rights granted by the California public trust. It

1 appears that one method by which TRPA could have fulfilled this
2 duty would have been to sign a memorandum of understanding
3 delegating authority to CSLC or otherwise formalizing a
4 relationship between the two. In such a memorandum, TRPA could
5 inform CSLC of TRPA's reliance, confirm that CSLC could meet TRPA's
6 needs, and make TRPA's approval of piers contingent on CSLC
7 approval. TRPA did not do this. The Amendments instead mandate
8 non-binding consultation with CSLC:

9 Prior to the approval of any project in
10 shorezone of the State of California that may
11 adversely affect legal public access, TRPA
12 shall consult with California State Lands
13 Commission to obtain the Commission's
14 determination whether legal public access
 exists under California law. If TRPA does not
 receive timely written comment from the
 Commission after providing notice of the
 proposed project, TRPA may approve the project
 without comment from State Lands[.]

15 Code § 54.4.B(1). Nothing compels TRPA to act in accordance with
16 CSLC's determination, and TRPA does not represent that it will
17 always do so.²⁷ See TRPA's brief at 26 ("TRPA may then incorporate
18 solutions to public access issues proposed by CSLC") (emphasis
19 added). It may be that, in practice, CSLC's own acts in granting
20 or withholding leases will be such that all piers comply with
21 California's public trust. TRPA may not shirk its own duty,
22 however, on the unexamined assumption that CSLC will not do the
23

24 ²⁷ The narrow exception is that when TRPA approves a pier
25 (with or without CSLC approval), the pier must "be located on the
26 parcel to minimize impacts to the environment and legal public
 access as determined pursuant to Subsection 54.4.B." Code §
 54.5.A(1)(c).

1 same, instead picking up TRPA's slack.

2 Furthermore, even piers that do not violate public trust
3 rights may "adversely affect the desire of pedestrians to move
4 laterally along the beach or affect waterside nearshore lateral
5 recreation (e.g., kayaking, swimming, top-line fishing)." TRPA's
6 brief at 27 (citing AR 2:743). Thus, while compliance with the
7 above standards lessens a pier's impact on recreational access, the
8 EIS and Amendments acknowledge that the above measures, standing
9 alone, are insufficient to ensure that the Amendments do not
10 interfere with recreational access. EIS 2:743, 783 ("The basis for
11 mitigation is that pier construction impairs public recreational
12 access along the lake."). Such additional mitigation is required
13 regardless of whether CSLC will ensure that new piers do not offend
14 California's public trust.

15 **b. Measures to Mitigate Remaining Recreational Impacts**

16 The Amendments propose to mitigate the unavoidable impacts of
17 new piers by using fees levied on new piers to remove existing
18 barriers to recreational access. Construction of a new private
19 pier will carry a fee of \$100,000, and expansion of a private pier
20 will incur a fee of \$20 per square foot of additional area. Code
21 § 54.13.A. The EIS contains conflicting explanations as to the
22 derivation of this fee. The final EIS first explains that:

23 The amount of the fee is based on estimation
24 of the costs of providing equivalent
25 replacement value for recreation and public
26 access by removing a pier from a developed
parcel and restricting development on the
parcel with an easement.

1 AR 2:744 (emphasis added). The document later states that:

2 The amount of the LTPAF fee is based on a
3 real-world estimation of the costs of
4 providing equivalent replacement value for
5 recreation and public access *that would result*
6 *from* removing a pier from a developed parcel
7 and restricting development on the parcel with
8 an easement.

9 AR 2:784 (emphasis added). Both explanations cite AR 6:3645, which
10 explains that this fee represents the physical cost of removing a
11 pier (e.g., labor, machinery and disposal) plus the cost of
12 purchasing a 10 linear foot easement on the subject land.

13 The parties sharply disagree as to how this money will be
14 spent, and thus whether the fee is adequate. Under either party's
15 interpretation of the program, the TRPA's finding was arbitrary and
16 capricious.

17 If the LTPAF is intended to pay for the removal of existing
18 piers, as plaintiffs argue, then the EIS fails to include a
19 reasonable examination into whether the fee is adequate.
20 Plaintiffs argue that there is no indication that lakefront
21 property owners would be willing to part with a pier for the
22 \$80,000 at which TRPA values an easement. If the LTPAF is intended
23 to actually fund removal of piers, pier owners' willingness to sell
24 piers for this price is "an important aspect of the problem" that
25 TRPA was required to consider. McNair, 537 F.3d at 987. TRPA has
26 not identified any such consideration in the EIS.

 TRPA argues that although the LTPAF fee is calculated based
on the price of removal, the fee is intended to be used to fund
other activities. The EIS, in describing the uses to which the

1 LTPAF fees will be put, states that the fund will go to "projects"
2 with priorities for acquisition of public access, construction or
3 modification of public access facilities, and "other projects that
4 demonstrably improve public recreational access." AR 2:744. Thus,
5 TRPA explains, the LTPAF will fund improvements to access that
6 provide a benefit equivalent to that of pier removal rather than
7 funding actual pier removal. While this may be a viable approach
8 in principle, it suffers from the same deficiencies identified with
9 regard to the Blue Boating Program and buoy mitigation fees. TRPA
10 has not included a "reasonably complete" discussion of what these
11 projects might be, their efficacy, or whether the LTPAF will be
12 able to afford them.

13 Lastly, for the reasons stated in part III(B)(2)(c)(i) above,
14 inclusion of the Adaptive Management Program in the package of
15 measures that will be used to mitigate impacts on recreation does
16 not render the discussion of mitigation "reasonably complete."

17 For these reasons, TRPA's conclusion that construction of new
18 piers authorized by the Amendments would not significantly
19 adversely affect recreation was arbitrary and capricious.²⁸

20 **c. Recreational Impacts of Buoys**

21 Plaintiffs separately argue that "the EIS failed to study the
22 recreational access impacts of more buoys." The EIS recognizes

23
24 ²⁸ Because the court resolves the recreational impacts issue
25 on these grounds, the court does not address CLSC's argument that
26 TRPA's decision to adopt the Amendments was invalidated by TRPA's
eleventh-hour omission of other proposed restrictions on pier
construction.

1 that "shorezone structures" can negatively impact users of "small
2 non-motorized watercraft," and that "buoys placed close together,
3 particularly if located in large buoy fields that extend far into
4 the Lake" may impair recreational fishing. AR 7:4184-85.²⁹
5 Contrary to plaintiffs' characterization of the record, however,
6 the EIS does not conclude that the recreational impacts of
7 shorezone structures generally, or buoys specifically, is
8 significant.

9 In arguing that a study of these effects was required,
10 plaintiffs cite several comments submitted during the EIS process
11 complaining about the impacts of buoy fields on kayaking. AR
12 4:2562, 25:16517, 26:16681-82. Plaintiffs argue that the
13 "substantial controversy" regarding buoys compelled such a study,
14 citing Babbitt, 241 F.3d at 731. The cited portion of Babbitt
15 concerned application of 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27, which provides that
16 controversy regarding the magnitude of effects is an indication
17 that those effects are significant for purposes of NEPA. 40 C.F.R.
18 § 1508.27(b)(4). In Glenbrook Homeowners Ass'n, 425 F.3d at 615-
19 16, the Ninth Circuit rejected a claim that controversy over a
20 project compelled TRPA to complete an EIS, explaining that such a
21 claim rests on NEPA regulations inapplicable to the Compact.

22
23 ²⁹ The court acknowledges some ambiguity as to whether the
24 above statement regarding "shorezone structures" implicates buoys.
25 TRPA has represented that this section of the EIS "analyzed the
26 impacts of buoys on recreation, including swimming and kayakers."
TRPA's Reply at 14 n.20. No other language in this section
implicates both buoys and kayaking. The court therefore
understands TRPA's statement to mean that shorezone structures, for
purposes of this issue, include buoys.

1 The inapplicability of 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27, however, does not
2 mean that TRPA's omission of further discussion is unreviewable.
3 The court must ask whether the EIS took a "hard look" at the
4 potential impacts. Methow Valley, 490 U.S. at 352. Agency action
5 is arbitrary and capricious where the agency has "entirely failed
6 to consider an important aspect of the problem." McNair, 537 F.3d
7 at 987. As the undersigned recently explained, an aspect of the
8 problem may be "important" for purposes of this rule even where it
9 is not "significant." S. Yuba River Citizens League v. Nat'l
10 Marine Fisheries Serv., ___ F. Supp. 2d. ___, ___, 2010 WL
11 2720959, *18, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67793, *62 (E.D. Cal. July 8,
12 2010) (reviewing the NMFS's silence as to certain factors in
13 discussing whether agency action would jeopardize protected species
14 in violation of the Endangered Species Act). Some issues are
15 important enough to demand a statement from the agency as to
16 whether or not they are significant. Id. Although no easy rule
17 separates the important from the unimportant, where TRPA itself has
18 stated that buoys impact recreation, the court is satisfied that
19 the problem is important.

20 The fact that TRPA has commented on the issue then raises the
21 question of whether the agency has taken the requisite "hard look."
22 The EIS recognized the potential problem but included no discussion
23 of its magnitude. This was not sufficient. The court does not
24 hold, on the present record, that TRPA was required to engage in
25 a full-blown EIS analysis of the impacts additional buoys would
26 have on non-motorized vehicle access, replete with additional

1 studies. Because these impacts were an important aspect of the
2 problem, however, TRPA was required to at least state a decision
3 as to whether or not these impacts were significant. This would
4 have enabled plaintiffs to challenge that decision and presented
5 the court with a record in which judicial review was possible. S.
6 Yuba, ___ F. Supp. 2d. at ___, 2010 WL 2720959, *18, 2010 U.S.
7 Dist. LEXIS 67793, *62.

8 **4. Mitigation of Scenic Impacts**

9 Plaintiffs challenge TRPA's finding that construction of new
10 piers would not have significant adverse impacts on scenery. The
11 EIS took the requisite hard look at these impacts and included a
12 reasonably complete discussion of mitigation measures. TRPA's
13 conclusion that piers would not adversely impact scenic values was
14 neither arbitrary nor capricious.

15 **a. Standards for Scenery**

16 Scenery, unlike air and water quality or even recreational
17 access, is difficult to quantify. TRPA has adopted four scenic
18 thresholds, each of which addresses different elements of scenic
19 quality in the basin. These thresholds may be summarized as
20 encompassing:

21 (SR-1) the quality of scenic resources from
22 viewpoints along major roadways in the Basin
and from the Lake towards shore;

23 (SR-2) the quality of specific views of scenic
24 features of the Basin's natural landscape that
can be seen from major roadways and the Lake;

25 (SR-3) the "viewshed" from public recreation
26 areas and certain bicycle trails; and

1 (SR-4) the design standards and guidelines for
2 the built environment to produce built
3 environments compatible with the natural,
scenic, and recreational values of the region.

4 Comm. for Reasonable Regulation of Lake Tahoe, 311 F. Supp. 2d at
5 979 (citing, inter alia, Resolution 82-11, Ordinance 93-14).

6 TRPA uses at least two quantitative tools in assessing scenic
7 value. One is a "contrast rating" that derives a numeric score
8 based on the size of a building's facade, the coloration, the
9 amount of glass, the building structure, the material texture, and
10 the obstruction of the facade's perimeter. See Shorezone Property
11 Owners' Request for Judicial Notice Ex. 2, at 144-50 (TRPA Design
12 Review Guidelines, App. H, Visual Assessment Tool for the Review
13 of Projects Located Within the Shoreland). Under this rating,
14 higher scores present better scenic values. Second, and more
15 simply, TRPA measures the amount of "visible mass."

16 TRPA also exercises informed judgment. For example, TRPA has
17 determined that visibility of man-made objects is not a per se
18 detriment to scenic quality. In discussing the scenic impacts of
19 additional buoys, TRPA concluded that the scenic impact of a boat
20 moored to a buoy "is not typically adverse because the presence of
21 watercraft is an expected component of lake views and contributes
22 to the scenic values of the lake." AR 2:782. TRPA concluded that
23 the sight of too many boats clustered together, however, did

24 ////

25 ////

26 ////

1 degrade scenic quality. Id.³⁰

2 **b. Avoidance and Mitigation of Piers' Scenic Impacts**

3 The EIS found that the addition of piers to the lake increases
4 visible mass in the shorezone and thereby impacts scenic quality.
5 AR 2:780. As with recreation, the Amendments address impacts on
6 scenery through a combination of measures designed to minimize the
7 impacts of new piers and measures designed to mitigate those
8 impacts that cannot be avoided. The former measures are largely
9 the same as those for recreation. Siting criteria restrict
10 construction of new piers in areas where they would have a
11 particularly dramatic impact on scenery, such as Shorezone
12 Protective Areas and "naturally dominated shoreline." AR 2:780.
13 Siting criteria also restrict pier density. Design criteria limit
14 pier size, construction, and coloration. AR 2:740.

15 Despite these restrictions, new piers will still have a visual
16 impact. The Amendments propose to mitigate these impacts by
17 requiring owners of new piers to remove visible mass and to achieve
18 certain contrast ratios. As to visible mass, in areas in
19 attainment of the scenic thresholds, the owner must mitigate the
20 pier's visible mass at a 1:1 ratio.³¹ Code § 54.6.D(1). In areas
21 not in scenic attainment, all visible mass must be mitigated at a
22 1:1.5 ratio. Id. This mitigation "must occur first in the

23
24 ³⁰ Plaintiffs here do not challenge TRPA's finding that the
25 buoys authorized by the Amendments would not have adverse impacts
26 on scenery.

³¹ The amended Ordinances impose slightly different, but more
rigorous, standards for mitigation of visible mass of boat lifts.

1 shorezone of the project; once shorezone possibilities are
2 exhausted, mitigation may occur in the project area shoreland.”
3 AR 2:740, Code § 54.6.D(2)(a). “Mitigation may either be removal
4 or screening of visible structure.” Code § 54.6.D(2)(d). As to
5 contrast, whenever a landowner constructs a pier or otherwise
6 undertakes a “project” in the shorezone, the landowner must bring
7 the onshore project area up to a contrast rating of 25. Code §
8 54.6.C(1). Because the landowners were previously only required
9 to reach a contrast rating of 21, this will likely lead to
10 improvements over existing conditions with regard to contrast. AR
11 2:781.³²

12 In contrast with the EIS’s discussion of mitigation of air,
13 water, and recreational impacts, the above discussion is reasonably
14 complete. Plaintiffs substantively disagree with TRPA’s conclusion
15 that the addition of visible mass on the lake can be mitigated by
16 removal of visible mass on the shore. As noted, a new pier must
17 be accompanied by an offset of visible mass and attainment of
18 contrast rating that TRPA found would be an improvement for most
19 parcels. Visible mass will also often be mitigated at a greater
20 than 1:1 ratio. Although the scenic character of a parcel without
21 a pier is undoubtedly *different* than that of a parcel with a pier,
22

23 ³² The EIS also states, in passing, that the LTPAF fees and
24 buoy fees will mitigate scenic impacts. AR 2:780, 782. The
25 description of the LTPAF program does not appear to refer to scenic
26 projects, and the court has previously explained these programs’
indefiniteness. Nonetheless, mere inclusion of these measures in
the discussion of mitigation of scenic impacts, without clear
reliance thereon, does not doom the EIS’s analysis.

1 equivalently reduced onshore visible mass, and an improved contrast
2 rating, TRPA concluded that the former was not *better*. This
3 conclusion was based on an analysis of simulations of what these
4 changes would look like in a variety of parcels and the agency's
5 considered opinion. AR 2:779-82, 6:3744-56. TRPA's finding that
6 the Amendments would not significantly adversely affect scenic
7 values was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

8 **5. Mitigation of Noise Impacts**

9 Plaintiffs' argument regarding impacts on noise follows a
10 familiar pattern. Plaintiffs argue that new boating facilities
11 will induce additional boating, that more boats will mean more
12 noise, and that the Amendments' proposals for mitigation of this
13 impact are impermissibly vague. The EIS acknowledges that the
14 Amendments will "increase noise levels throughout the area" by
15 inducing "increases in boating activity." AR 2:791. This impact
16 is purportedly mitigated by "[t]he Blue Boating Program, monitoring
17 and enforcement programs funded by annual buoy fees, and the
18 LTPAF." Id.

19 _____With respect to noise, the Blue Boating Program and LTPAF
20 suffer the same problems discussed above. In addition to the Blue
21 Boating Program elements pertaining to air and water quality, the
22 Blue Boating Program will include "[a] noise reduction program to
23 implement noise guidelines for the protection of wildlife and
24 community well-being." Code § 54.15.A(2). The EIS's discussion
25 of noise states that the Blue Boating Program will include
26 "standards regarding appropriate engine types, engine emissions,

1 and other boating features[] and use of appropriate engine
2 equipment with regard to noise standards." AR 2:791. These
3 features, equipment types, etc., are unspecified and their benefits
4 unexplained. As to the LTPAF, the EIS asserts that this program
5 will reduce noise by funding programs which encourage non-motorized
6 boating, such as by improving recreational access. AR 2:792. The
7 nature of these programs is not specified, nor is there any
8 discussion of the extent to which such programs might induce would-
9 be motorized boaters to use non-motorized boats instead.

10 The discussion of increased enforcement is more definite but
11 nonetheless insufficient. Existing rules prohibit aftermarket
12 boating devices that cause high "single event noise" and require
13 low speeds in no-wake zones and Emerald Bay, which reduces engine
14 noise. Code § 81.2.E(2)(b)(2), AR 11:7634. Present non-attainment
15 of the noise thresholds results, in part, from inadequate
16 enforcement of these limits. AR 11:7631. The Amendments will
17 provide additional funding for enforcement, derived from buoy fees
18 and possibly the Blue Boating Program.³³ Thus, the EIS describes
19 a reasonably specific method for reducing the impacts of noise.
20 The EIS provides only a bare assertion, however, that the
21 additional enforcement reduces impacts *enough* to render them
22 insignificant. See also part III(B)(2)(c)(i) above.

23
24 ³³ Compare AR 2:791 (The Blue Boating Program and programs
25 funded by the annual buoy fee would include monitoring and
26 enforcement" of speed restrictions) with AR 2:830-31 (providing no
reference to speed limits in describing the enforcement or
mitigation fee aspects of the Blue Boating Program).

1 Accordingly, the TRPA's conclusion that the Amendments would
2 not impose significant adverse effects on noise was arbitrary and
3 capricious.

4 **C. The Outstanding National Resource Water Standard**

5 The Clean Water Act creates a scheme of cooperative federalism
6 under which, inter alia, States are directed "to institute
7 comprehensive water quality standards establishing water quality
8 goals for all intrastate waters." PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dep't of
9 Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 704 (1994) (citing 33 U.S.C. §§
10 1311(b)(1)(C), 1313). These standards must incorporate an
11 "'antidegradation policy.'" Id. at 718 (quoting 33 U.S.C. §
12 1313(d)(4)(B)). "The antidegradation policy and implementation
13 methods shall, at a minimum," maintain three tiers of water
14 quality. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a). California has adopted an
15 antidegradation policy that is more nuanced than the minimum
16 provided by 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a), but which also incorporates the
17 three federal tiers. Cal. State Water Resources Control Board,
18 Memorandum: Federal Antidegradation Policy, Oct. 7, 1987, at 2
19 (citing Cal. SWRCB Resolution No. 68-16, "Statement of Policy with
20 Respect to Maintaining High Quality Waters in California," and Cal.
21 SWRCB Order No. WQ 86-17).

22 California protects Lake Tahoe under the most stringent of the
23 three tiers, as an "Outstanding National Resource Water"
24 ("ONRW").³⁴ This designation "prohibits any degradation of

25
26 ³⁴ The parties agree that the California SWRCB designated Lake
Tahoe as an ONRW in 1980.

1 existing water quality standards with a limited exception for
2 short-term or temporary changes in quality.” Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n
3 v. Browner, 127 F.3d 1126, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing Water
4 Quality Standards Regulation, 48 Fed. Reg. 51,400, 51,403 (1983)).
5 Article V(d) of the Compact provides that “[t]he regional plan
6 shall provide for attaining and maintaining Federal State, or local
7 air and water quality standards, whichever are strictest, in the
8 respective portions of the region for which the standards are
9 applicable.” Plaintiffs argue that TRPA must therefore comply with
10 the ONRW standard, but that the Amendments will cause decreases in
11 water quality. TRPA opposes this claim solely by arguing that the
12 Amendments will not result in degradation of water quality.

13 This claim imperfectly parallels plaintiffs’ EIS claim. For
14 example, while the Compact’s EIS provision obliges TRPA provide
15 information sufficient to enable meaningful public participation,
16 the ONRW claim appears to merely challenge TRPA’s conclusion that
17 the Amendments would achieve the requisite substantive result.
18 Nonetheless, the deficiencies in the record identified in part
19 III(B)(2), above, demonstrate that TRPA acted arbitrarily and
20 capriciously in adopting the Amendments in the face of the ONRW
21 designation.

22 **IV. Conclusion**


23 For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs’ motion for summary
24 judgment (Dkt. No. 87) is GRANTED and defendants’ cross motion for
25

1 summary judgment (Dkt. No. 98) is DENIED. Tahoe Regional Planning
2 Agency Ordinance number 2008 - 10, adopted October 22, 2008, the
3 Shorezone Amendments adopted at that time, the certification of the
4 Environmental Impact Statement, and all findings based thereon are
5 VACATED. The matter is REMANDED to defendant Tahoe Regional
6 Planning Agency for further proceedings consistent with this order.
7 The clerk shall enter judgment and close the file.

8 IT IS SO ORDERED.

9 DATED: September 16, 2010.

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LAWRENCE K. KARLTON
SENIOR JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT